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Rémy Oddou†
March 5, 2011

Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of spillovers and congestion of local public
goods on the segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdiction.
Households living in the same place form a jurisdiction and produce a local
public good, that creates positive spillovers in other jurisdictions and suffers
from congestion. In every jurisdiction, the production of the local public good
is financed through a local tax on household’s wealth. Local wealth tax rates
are democratically determined in all jurisdictions. Households also consume
housing in their jurisdiction. Any household is free to leave its jurisdiction for
another one that would increase its utility. A necessary and sufficient condition
to have every stable jurisdiction structure segregated by wealth, for a large class
of congestion measure and any spillovers coefficient structure, is identified: the
public good must be a gross substitute or a gross complement to the private
good and the housing.
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Introduction

In most countries, local public spending accounts for a large share of the public spending (almost 50% in the USA), and this share is increasing since the end of the Second
World War. As a consequence of the growing role played by local jurisdictions, another phenomenon appeared: jurisdictions belonging to the same urban area seem to
be more differenciated in terms of their inhabitants’ wealth. One reason for this can
be explained by Tiebout’s 1956 article. In his intuitions, he claims that individuals, by
choosing their place of residence according to a trade-off between local tax rates and
amounts of public good provided, leads every jurisdiction to be homogenous. The formation of jurisdictions structure is endogenous, due to the free mobility of households,
that can vote with their feet , that is to say leave their jurisdiction to another one,
if they are unsatisfied with their jurisdiction’s tax rate and amount of public good.
There exists a wide literature dealing with the endogenous jurisdiction formation a
∗ I’m indebted to Antonio Accetturo, Pierre-Philippe Combes, and Nicolas Gravel for their very
helpful comments and suggestions.
† remy.oddou@free.fr, Aix-Marseille University and IDEP-GREQAM, Chateau Lafarge, Route des
Milles, 13290 Les Milles, France
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la Tiebout. A widely spread belief is the self-sorting mecanism of the endogenous
formation process: agents will live in homogenous jurisdiction. This homogeneity can
be expressed in terms of wealth, preferences on public good, on housing, on economic
activity...
Westhoff (1977) was among the first economists to provide a formal model based on
Tiebout’s intuitions. In this model, households can enjoy 2 goods, a local public good,
financed through a local tax on wealth, which is a pure club good (only households
living in the jurisdiction that produced it can enjoy it), and a composite private good,
whose amount is equal to the after-tax wealth. He found a condition that ensures
both the existence of an equilibrium, and at the equilibrium, the jurisdiction structure
will be wealth-stratified. The condition to ensure the existence of an equilibrium is
to have the slope of individuals’ indifference curve in the tax rate-amount of public
good plan to be ordered by their private wealth. If this condition holds, not only an
equilibrium will exist, but at equilibrium, the jurisdiction structure will be segregated.
Rose-Ackerman (1979) proposed a model a la Westhoff, but improved it with the
introduction of a competitive land market and taxation on housing, and raised the
difficulty of reaching an equilibrium, because preferences are not necessary singlepeaked over the tax rate if households take into account the fact that a modification
of the tax rate will have an impact on their consumption. When taxation is based
on housing value, even with pretty simpe utility function such as a Cobb-Douglas
function. Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984) found pretty restrictive conditions on
preferences and on the public good production technology to ensure the existence of
an equilibrium with a competitive land market.
Konishi (1996) found conditions for an equilibrium to exist of the jurisdiction
structure with multiple local public goods produced by firms and financed by a tax
on wealth, the quantity to produce being determined through Greenberg (1977) dmajority voting rule. His article raise the problem of the non-convexity of households
consumption set and preference when they can freely move from their jurisdiction to
another one.
Nechyba (1997) developped a model with housing, but contrary to Rose-Ackerman,
housing is modeled as a discreet good, which differ on type, and households own their
house, so wealth is not anymore exogenous, since housing price may vary. In his
model, spillovers between jurisdictions were allowed, because households’ utility depends not only on the amount of public good in its jurisdiction and a national public
good, but also on the amounts of public good in all jurisdiction. After having ensured the existence of equilibrium under certain conditions, he identified sufficient
conditions for a stable jurisdiction structure to be segregated. Unfortunately, one of
these sufficient conditions was the absence of spillovers between jurisditions, which is
a pretty strong assumption, that might not be necessary.
Gravel and Thoron (2007) identified a condition that ensure the segregation, in
Westhoff’s sense, of any stable jurisdiction structure : the public good must be, for
all level of prices and income, either always a complement or a substitute to the private good. This condition is identified as the Gross Subtitutability/Complementarity
(GSC) condition. This condition implies that, for any level of prices and wealth, the
preferred tax rate will be a monotonous function of the private wealth. Biswas, Gravel
and Oddou (2009) integrated a welfarist central government to the model, whose pur-
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pose is to maximize a generalized utilitarian social welfare function by implementing
an equalization payment policy. Equalization payment can be either vertical (the government taxes households and redistributes the revenues to jurisdictions), horizontal
(the government redistributes local tax revenues between the jurisdictions), or mixed.
They showed that the GSC condition remains necessary and sufficient.
The effect of spillovers on the provision of public goods and on the equilibrium
have been analyzed by Bloch and Zenginobuz (2006 and 2006 bis). However, the
authors do not consider the endogenous formation of jurisdiction structure, but only
jurisdiction structure with a fixed number of jurisdictions.
In this paper, I generalize Gravel & Thoron’s model by assuming that local public
goods may suffer from congestion and create spillovers. Households choose a location,
each set of households living in the same place forms a jurisdiction. In each jurisdiction, absenties landlords use the land available in the jurisdiction to produce housing.
The quantity of housing and its price are competitive, so the housing supply is equal
to the housing demand for that price. Then every jurisdiction determines democratically its tax rate (which is applied to households’ wealth), and the revenues generated
by this tax are fully used to financed a local public good, that may suffer of congestion.
Futhermore, households may benefit from other jurisdictions’ local public good.
This assumption differs from the main part of the literature on local public goods.
However, considering that small towns belonging to a metropolitan area benefit from
the public good provided by the main city is not outlandish.
Households are assumed to be freely mobile, so, once all the jurisdictions have
determined its tax rate, households can leave their jurisdiction for another one that
would increase their utility. The equilibrium is reached when no households has
incentive to leave its jurisdiction and to modify its consumption bundle, the housing
price clear the market and the local tax rate are democratic. We assume, as in Gravel
and Oddou (2010), that preferences are :
1. additively separable between the public good on one hand, and the housing and
the wealth available left on the other,
2. restricted homothetic between the housing and the wealth available left conditionally to the amount of public good.
These assumptions, though restrictive, seem to be relevant with respect to recent
data, cf Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2007).
This paper aims to examine the segregative properties of the endogenous jurisdiction structure formation in such a framework. The robustness of the conditions
imposed in Gravel & Oddou (2010) that ensure the segregation of any stable jurisdiction structure is verified.
The article is organized as follows. The next section introduces the formal model.
Section 3 provides an example of how congestion and spillovers can modify a jurisdiction structure. Section 4 states and proves the results. Finally, section 5 concludes.

2

The formal model

We consider a model a la Gravel and Thoron (2007), improved by the presence of a
competitive land market, spillovers and congestion. There is a continuum of house3
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holds on the interval [0; 1] with Lebesgue measure λ, where, for any subset I ⊂ [0; 1],
the mass of household in I is given by λ(I). The households’ wealth distribution is
∗
modeled as a Lebesgue measure ω : [0; 1] → R+
- household i is endowed with a
∗
wealth ωi ∈ R+ - with ω being a increasing and bounded from above function.
Households have identical preferences, represented by a twice differentiable, in3
creasing and concave utility function U : R++
→ R+ :
U (Z, h, m)
1. Z is the available amount of public good households can enjoy
2. h is their amount of housing,
3. m is the amount of the household’s expenditure for other things than housing.
All those goods are assumed to be normal.
The utility function is assumed to be additively separable between the public good
on one hand, and the housing and other expenditures on the other hand. The utility
2
function is additively separable if there exist f : R+ → R+ and g : R+
→ R+ , both
twice differentiable, increasing and concave real valued (with respect to each argument
for g), such that
U (Z, h, m) = f (Z) + g(h, m)

Another property is assumed : conditional homotheticity between housing and
other expenditures. This property implies that the share of their private wealth
households will spend on housing and on other expenditure does not depend on their
private wealth. Under separable additivity, an utility function is homothetic condi2
→ R+ such that
tional to the public good if and only if ∃Γ : R+ → R+ , ψ : R+
Γ(ψ(ph , pm )(1 − t)ω) = max g(h, m)
h,m

s.t. ph h + pm m ≤ (1 − t)ωi
Each household has to choose a place of residence among all the conceivable location. J ⊂ N is the finite set of locations, with card(J) = M . Households living at
the same location form a jurisdiction.
∗
of building lands, on which absentee
Every location j has an amount Lj ∈ R+
landlords are able to construct and/or keep in repair a quantity of housing Hj ∈ [0; Lj ]
they can rent at the competitive gross price pj . Of course, the total housing supply
depends on the price, and the cost function of housing is such that Hj (0) = 0 and
Hj (pj ) is strictly increasing with pj .
Since housing is costly, and that households only enjoy the housing that is located in
their own jurisdiction, then, obviously, no household will consume housing in more
than one jurisdiction.
We denote µi,j as the measure of households with private wealth ωi living inP
jurisdiction j, µi as the measure of households with private wealth ωi , hence µi = µi,j
j

in the whole area, and finally µj as the measure of households living in jurisdiction j.
The amount of public good a household in jurisdiction j can enjoy is given by
Zj = π(ζj , Sj )
with :
4
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2
• π : R+
→ R+ being a non-decreasing (strictly increasing with respect to ζj ,
twice differenciable, concave function such that ∀y ∈ R+ , π(0, y) = 0

• ζj is the amount of public good produced by jurisdiction j,
• Sj is the amount of spillovers from other jurisdictions in jurisdiction j,
X
Sj =
(βjk ζk
k∈J−{j}

where βjk ∈ R+ represents the spillovers coefficient of jurisdiction k’s local public good in jurisdiction j (exogenously determined).
The amount of local public good produced by jurisdiction j is given by
tj $ j
Cj

ζj =
with :
• tj being the local tax rate,
• $j being the aggregated wealth in j,

2M
• Cj = C({µk }k∈J , {βkj }k∈J ) is the congestion function, with C : R+
→ [1; +∞[,
continuous and non-decreasing (with respect to every argument).

Assuming that the intensity of the congestion faced by jurisdiction j’s public good
because the mass of households in jurisdiction j 0 depends on the spillovers coefficient
j’s ublic good creates in j 0 is quite reasonable, since a public good will suffer more
from a important mass of households in a jurisdiction that receives a lot of public
good spillovers than from a important mass of households that receive little spillovers.
Moreover, it is assumed that if jurisdiction j’s public good creates no spillovers in
jurisiction j 0 (i.e. βj 0 j = 0), then the congestion function is constant with respect to
µj 0 . Formally,
∂C({µk }k∈J , {βkj }k∈J )
βj 0 j = 0 ⇒
=0
∂µj 0
However, one could specify the congestion measure in such a way that there would
be no relation between congestion and spillovers coefficient. The present definition
of the congestion measure does not exclude such an assumption. The only properties
assumed on the congestion function are that:
1. ∀(j, k) ∈ J 2 , ∀{µl }l∈J−{k} ∈ RM −1 , ∀{βl j}l∈J ∈ [0; 1]M :
∂Cj ({µl }l∈J , {βlj }l∈J )
=0
µk →+∞
∂µk
lim

2. ∀(j, k, k 0 ) ∈ J 3 , ∀{µl }l∈J−{k,k0 } ∈ RM −2 , ∀{βl j}l∈J ∈ [0; 1]M :
∂ 2 Cj ({µl }l∈J , {βlj }l∈J )
≤0
µk →+∞
∂µk ∂µk0
lim

The first property is certainly restrictive, but not unreasonable though, it requires
that the marginal congestion in one jurisdiction generated by a infinitesimal increase of
the mass of household, in this very jurisdiction, or another one) tends to be null when
the mass of households is infinite. Such a property respect, for instance, homogenous
function of degree less than 1. The second property is more natural since, to some
5
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extent, the masses of households in different jurisdictions are substitutable concerning
$
the congestion they provide in one jurisdiction. For simplicity, we denote Fj = Cjj as
jurisdiction j’s fiscal potential, that is to say the maximal amount of public good the
jurisdiction can produce (it tj = 1).
The demand for housing and private consumption that a household i has depend
on his disposable income (1 − tj )ωi and on the housing price in jurisdiction j, pj . We
defined hM (pj , (1 − tj )ωi ; Zj ) and mM (pj , (1 − tj )ωi ; Zj ) as respectively the Marshallian demand for housing and for wealth of a household i in jurisdiction j, e.g.
(hM (pj , (1 − tj )ωi ; Zj ), mM (pj , (1 − tj )ωi ; Zj ) ∈ arg max U (Z, h, m)
h,m

subject to
pj h + m = (1 − tj )ωi
.
Under the additive separability assumption, those Marshallian demands do not depend on the amount of public good, that is the reason why, from now, Z will be
withdrawn from the arguments of the Marshallian demands.
The local tax rate is determined according to a democratic rule. Hence, every
4
household has to determine its favorite tax rate, denoted t∗ : R+
→ [0; 1], which is a
function of:
• the fiscal potential F ,
• the spillovers from other jurisdictions’ public good S
• the housing price p,
• the private wealth ωi .
Formally,
t∗ (F, S, p, ωi ) = arg max U (π(tF, S), hM (p, (1 − t)ωi ), (1 − t)ωi − phM (p, (1 − t)ωi ))
t

Lemma 1. If the utility function respects the properties assumed above, then the
utility function is single-peaked with respect to t, so t∗ always exists.
Proof. The proof of this lemma can be obtained easily by differentiating twice the
utility function with respect to t:
∂hM (p, R
∂mM (p, R
∂U (π(tF, S), hM (p, (1 − t)ωi ), mM (p, (1 − t)ωi ))
= UZ F π 0 (tF, S)−(
ωi )Uh −(
)ωi )Um
∂t
∂R
∂R
Hence, under additive separability and conditional homotheticity, UZh = UZm = 0
2 M
2
M
= ∂ m∂R2(p,R = 0. As a consequence, one has:
and ∂ h∂R(p,R
2
∂ 2 U (π(tF, S), hM (p, (1 − t)ωi ), mM (p, (1 − t)ωi ))
∂t2
=
∂hM (p, R ∂mM (p, R
∂mM (p, R 2
∂h (p, R 2
ωi ) Uhh +2ωi2
Uhm +(
ωi ) Umm
∂R
∂R
∂R
∂R
Since both U (Z, h, m) and π(ζ, S) are concave with respect to all their arguments,
this expression is negative, so the utility function is concave with respect to the tax
rate.

F 2 [UZZ (π 0 (tF, S))2 +UZ π 00 (tF, S)]+(

M

6
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The indirect utility function conditional to an amount of public good Z, denoted
3
V C : R+
→ R+ , depends on the housing price and the net-of-tax wealth, with the
amount of public good as a parameter, and represents the highest possible level of
utility a household can reach. Formally,
V C (Z; p, (1 − t − c)ωi ) = U (Z, hM (p, (1 − t)ωi ), (1 − t)ωi − phM (p, (1 − t)ωi ))
Let’s define
t∗j = min t∗ (Fj , Sj , pj , (1 − tj )ωi )
i∈Ij

and
t̄∗j = max t∗ (Fj , Sj , pj , (1 − tj )ωi )
i∈Ij

as respectively the lowest and the highest tax rate preferred by a household living in
jurisdiction j.
Definition A jurisdiction structure is a triplet S = (({Ij }j∈J ); ({tj }j∈J ); ({pj }j∈J ), ({Sj }j∈J ).
Definition A jurisdiction structure is stable if and only if
1. ∀j, j 0 ∈ J, ∀i ∈ Ij , U (Zj , hij , mij ) ≥ V (Zj 0 , pj 0 , (1 − tj 0 )ωi )
R
2. ∀j ∈ J, hM (pj , (1 − tj )ωi )dλ = Hj (pj )
Ij

3. ∀j ∈ J, tj ∈ [t∗j ; t̄∗j ]
In words, a jurisdiction structure is stable if and only if :
1. No household can increase its utility by modifying its consumption bundle or by
leaving its jurisdiction,
2. The housing prices are competitive in every jurisdiction (supply equals demand)
3. The tax rate is democratically chosen in every jurisdiction.
Let now express formally the definition of the segregation, which is the same
definition as in Westhoff 1977.
Definition A jurisdiction structure is segregated if and only if ∀ωh , ωi , ωk ∈ R+
such that ωh < ωi < ωk , (h, k) ∈ Ij and i ∈ Ij 0 ⇒ Zj = Zj 0 and ∀ω ∈ R+ , V C (Zj , pj , (1−
tj )ω) = V C (Zj 0 , pj 0 , (1 − tj 0 )ω)
In words, a structure jurisdiction is wealth-segregated if, except for groups jurisdictions that offer same amount of public good and in which every household would
have the same utility in all jurisdictions, the poorest household of a jurisdiction with
a high per capita wealth is (weakly) richer than the richest household in a jurisdiction
with a lower per capita wealth.
Let define Jj = {k : Zk = Zj and ψ(pk )(1 − tk ) = ψ(pj )(1 − tj )}. In words, Jj is
the set of all jurisdictions offering the same amount of available public good as j, and
such that households have the same purchasing power within the meaning of Hicks1 .
Obviously, for all j ∈ J, households are indifferent between all jurisdictions belonging
to Jj .
Formally, a jurisdiction
S structure is segregated if and only if, when, for all j ∈ J,
we define Jj , the set
Ik is a connected set.
k∈Jj
1 2 vectors of prices and income (p , ...p , R) and (p0 , .., p0 , R0 ) provide the same purchasing
1
K
1
K
power within the meaning of Hicks if and only if V (p1 , ...pK , R) = V (p01 , .., p0K , R0 )

7
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3

Example

Let consider the example provided by Gravel & Thoron, improved by the presence of
housing. Households’ preferences are represented by
(
√
√
if hm ≤
ln(Z) + 8 hm − 4hm
√
√
U (Z, h, m) =
49
14
) hm + 16(ln(1,75)−1)
ln(2 hm) otherwise
ln(Z) + (1 − 4(ln(1.75)−1)
Such an utility function is continuous, twice differentiable, increasing and concave
with respect to every argument. The indirect utility fonction conditional to the public
good is given by
(
(1−t)2 ωi2 )
i
√
ln(Z) + 4(1−t)ω
−
p
p
C
V (Z; p, (1−t)ωi ) =
(1−t)ωi )
7
49
√ i +
ln(Z) + (0, 5 − 4(ln(1.75)−1)
) (1−t)ω
p
16(ln(1,75)−1) ln(
p

7
4

if

(1−t)ωi
p

≤

7
4

otherwise

Let suppose that the available amount of public good in jurisdiction k is given by
t F
t F
Zj = π( jCjj , Sj ) = jCjj (1 + Sj )
Consider an economy with√2 jurisdictions j1 and j2 and 3 types of households a, b, c
11.9
√ ,
with private wealth ωa = 2− 2, ωb = 1.5 and ωc = 3 and whose mass are µa = 2−
2
1
µb = 8 and µc = 30 . For simplicity, let assume that the tax rate is determined through
the majority voting rule, and that the housing supply is perfectly elastic with respect
to its price, that will
be considered as fixed to 1 in both jurisdictions.
√
For all ωi ≤ 3+2 7 , the preferred tax rate function is given by
∗

t (F, S, ωi ) =

ωi − 2 +

p

(ωi − 2)2 + 2
2ωi

Determining the preferred
tax rate function of an households endowed with a private
√
3+ 7
wealth greater than 2 will not be required, since households of type c will never
be majoritary in their jurisdiction, so their preferred tax rate will never be applied.
One can observe that the preferred tax rate does not depend on the fiscal potential,
which will greatly facilitate the example.
Let assume first that there is no congestion and no spillovers, so C ≡ 1 and S ≡ 0.
Then, the available amount of public in a jurisdiction j is simply the tax revenue:
Zj = tj $j . Suppose that households of type a and c live in j1 , while households of
type b live in j2 . Then, in both jurisdiction, the aggregate wealth will be equal to
12, the tax rate in j1 , denoted t1 , will be equal to 21 , while t2 = 13 . Since, at first,
it is assumed that C1 = C2 = 1 and S1 = S2 = 0, one has Z1 = 6 and Z2 = 4.
Such a jurisdiction structure is stable, since the fiscal potential is the same in both
jurisdictions, households of type a and b have their favorite tax rate in their respective
jurisdiction, and households of type c are better-off in j1 , in which they enjoy an utility
level equal to ln(6) + 15
4 ≈ 5.54, against ln(4) + 4 ≈ 5.51 if they would move to j2 .
Now, let reconsider the example when the local public goods suffer from congestion, with
√
30 + µk
Ck =
30
Then, the amount of public good in j1 will be equal to
Z1 =
30 +

180
q

11.9
√
2− 2

+

1
30

≈ 5.216

8
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and, in j2 ,

120
√ ≈ 3.655
30 + 8
which will have households of type c moving to j2 , in which they will enjoy an utility
49ln2)
120
7
√ )+2(0.5−
level of ln( 30+
4(ln(1.75)−1) )+ 16(ln(1,75)−1) ≈ 5.424 while their utility level
8
p180
) + 15
would have been ln(
11.9
1
4 ≈ 5.402 if they had stayed in j1 . Households
Z2 =

30+

2−

√

2

+ 30

of type a and b would not have incentive to move, since households of type a would
enjoy an utility level of approximatively 2.74 in j1 against 2.71 in j2 , and households
of type b, an utility level of 4.30 in j2 and 4.09 in j1 .
Is the new jurisdiction structure stable after that households of type c had moved
from j1 to j2 ? Since the preferred tax rate function is constant with respect to the
fiscal potential, the tax rate will be the same in every jurisdiction. Once households
of type c moved from j1 to j2 , the new amount of public good in j1 will be
Z1 =

178.5
q
≈ 5.173
11.9
√
30 + 2−
2

Z2 =

120 + 13
q
30 + 8 +

and in j2 ,

≈ 3.665
1
30

so households of type a will get a higher utility level in j1 than in j2 (approximatively
2.73 against 2.71, while households of type b and of type c can enjoy a higher utility
level by staing in j2 than if they moved to j1 , respectively with 4.30 against 4.08 for
households of type b and 5.43 against 5.39 for households of type c, so this new structure is stable and segregated, while the previous one was stable and non-segergated
as long as no congestion effects were assumed. In this very specific example, the
congestion seems to increase the segregative properties of the endogenous jurisdiction
structure formation. Let now introduce spillovers in the example to observe what
impact they can have. Suppose that jurisdiction j1 ’s local public good generates
spillovers in jurisdiction j2 , and vice-versa. For instance, suppose that the available
amount in a jurisdiction k is given by
Zk =
with Sk =

P
l∈J\{j}

tk Fk (1 + Sk )
Ck

l Fl
βkl tC
. Since local public goods generate spillovers in other jurisl

dictions, it is not unreasonable to assume that the congestion function also depends
on the mass of households in other jurisdictions and on the spillovers coefficients. Let
then redefine the congestion function as follows:
Ck = 1+
Although j1 produces more public good than j2 , suppose that jurisdiction j1
receives more spillovers from j2 ’s public good than vice-versa, for instance
S1 =

40 + 19
q
30 + 8 +

S2 =

36.3
q
≈ 1.034
11.9
√
30 + 2−
2

and

≈ 1.222
1
30

9
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hence β12 = 13 and β21 = 15 . With such spillovers coefficients, the amounts of public
good produced by each jurisdiction are
178.5

ζ1 =
30 +
and

q

11.9
√
2− 2

+ 51 (8 +

120 + 31
q
1
30 + 8 + 30
+

ζ2 =

1
30 )

≈ 5.13

≈ 3.53

1 11.9
√
3 2− 2

So, the available amounts of public good households can enjoy are now
1
Z1 = ζ1 (1 + ζ2 ) ≈ 11.29
3
and

1
Z2 = ζ2 (1 + ζ1 ) ≈ 7.18
5
As a consequence, households of type c will move back to j1 , in which they will be
able to enjoy an utility level of approximatively 6.17, against 6.10 if they stayed in
j2 . Households of type a and b can not increase their utility by voting wth their feet,
since households of type a’s utility is about 3.51 in j1 while it would be about 3.38 in
j2 , and households of type b have an utility level of approximatively 4.97 in j2 against
4.86 if they moved to j1 .
Finally, the jurisdiction structure in which jurisdiction j1 is composed of households of type a and c, and j2 is composed of households of type b is stable: with
households of type c in j1 instead of j2 , the new amounts of public goods produced
by each jurisdiction are now
180

ζ1 =
30 +

q

and

11.9
√
2− 2

+

1
30

+

8
5

≈ 5.13

120

ζ2 =
30 +

q

11.9
√ +
8 + 13 ( 2−
2

1
30 )

≈ 3.53

so
Z1 ≈ 11.513
and
Z2 ≈ 7.18
One can observe that, due to the existence of spillovers between jurisdictions, households of type c’s change of jurisdiction has almost no impact on the available amount
of public good in each jurisdiction, then the utility levels will remains almost the same
for all type of households.
As a conclusion, this example suggests that congestion favors the segregative properties of endogenous jurisdiction formation, whereas the existence of spillovers tends
to decrease the number of stable segergated jurisdiction structures.
However, in the next section, the validity of the GCS condition, that was necessary and sufficient to ensure the segregation of every stable jurisdiction structure, is
established within the existence of cogestion effect and spillovers.

10
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4

Results

The main result of this paper is the robustness of the Gross Substitutability/Complementarity
condition to the existence of spillovers and congestion effect on the local public goods
to have all stable jurisdiction structures segregated. As in Gravel and Thoron (2007),
this condition is equivalent to the monotonicity of the preferred tax rate function with
respect to the private wealth, for any given amount of the other arguments. To prove
this equivalence, let first etablish the following lemma.
Definition Let define π −1 (Z; S) : R+ → R+ as the amount of fiscal potential needed
to have an available amount of public good Z if the amount of spillovers is S. Formally,
π(π −1 (Z; S), S) = Z
Since π(F, S) is continuous and strictly increasing with respect to F , π −1 (Z; S)
always exists.
Lemma 2. For all utility function U satisfying the above properties, ∀(F, S, p, ωi ) ∈
4
R+
, we have
t∗ (F, S, p, ωi ) ≡

1
p 1
1 −1 M
π [Z (
, , , 1); S]
F
F πζ (t∗ (F, S, p, ωi )F, S) ωi ωi

(1)

Proof. At the optimum, the Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) is equal to the
price ratio. Then:
UZ (Z, h, m)
pZ
=
Um (Z, h, m)
pm

(2)

The FOC of the utility maximization program with respect to t implies that:
UZ (π(t∗ F, S), hM , (1 − t)omegai − phM )
ωi
2
=
∗
M
M
∗
Um (π(t F, S), h , (1 − t)omegai − ph )
F πζ (t (F, S, p, ωi )F, S)

(3)

Then, using 2 and 3, we know that:
π(t∗ (F, S, p, ωi )F, S) ≡ Z M (

ωi
, p, 1, ωi )
∗
F πζ (t (F, S, p, ωi )F, S)

(4)

Since Marshallian demands are homogenous of degree 0, we can divide all the arguments of the Marshallian demand for the public good by ωi .
π(t∗ (F, S, p, ωi )F, S); S)M (

1
p 1
, , , 1)
F πζ (t∗ (F, S, p, ωi )F, S) ωi ωi

(5)

Then, using the definition of π −1 (Z; S), we know that:
t∗ (F, S, p, ωi )F, S) ≡ π −1 (Z M (

1
p 1
, , , 1); S)
F πζ (t∗ (F, S, p, ωi )F, S) ωi ωi

(6)

This lemma states that the favorite tax rate function is equivalent to an affine
function of the Marshallian demand for public good. This lemma is used to prove
that the favorite tax rate function is monotonic with respect to the private wealth if
and only if the public good is either always a substitute or always a complement to
the housing and the available wealth (this condition is called the GSC condition).
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Lemma 3. For all utility function that are additively separable between the public good
on one hand and the housing and private consumption on the other, and homothetic
between the housing and the private consumption, the public good is a complement
(resp. a substitute) to the housing if and only if it is also a complement (resp. a
substitute) to the available wealth.
Proof. Under additive separability and restricted homothety assumptions, the indirect
utility function conditional to an amount Z of available public good can be written
as :
V C (Z, ph , pm , y) = f (Z) + g[φ(ph , pm )(ωi − pZ Z)]
where ph and pm are respectively the unit price of goods h and m, and ωi is the
available income. By definition, the derivative of this expression with respect to Z is
equal to 0 when Z = Z M (pZ , ph , pm , ωi ) (First order condition), so :
f 0 (Z M (pZ , ph , pm , ωi )) = g 0 [φ(ph , pm )(ωi − pZ Z M (pZ , ph , pm , ωi )]φ(ph , pm )pZ
By deriving this equality with respect to ph , one obtains :
∂φ(ph , pm ) g 00 [φ(ph , pm )(ωi − pZ Z)]φ(ph , pm )(R − pZ Z) + g 0 [φ(ph , pm )(ωi − pZ Z)]
∂Z M (pZ , ph , pm , ωi )
=
pZ
∂ph
∂ph
g 00 (Z) + g 00 [φ(ph , pm )(ωi − pZ Z)]φ2 (ph , pm )p2Z
The denominator is clearly negative because of the concavity of the utility function,
so as ∂φ(p∂phh,pm ) pZ , hence
sign(

∂Z M (pZ , ph , pm , ωi )
) = sign(g 00 [φ(ph , pm )(ωi −pZ Z)]φ(ph , pm )(R−pZ Z)+g 0 [φ(ph , pm )(ωi −pZ Z)])
∂ph

Symmetrically, one can deduce that
sign(

∂Z M (pZ , ph , pm , ωi )
) = sign(g 00 [φ(ph , pm )(ωi −pZ Z)]φ(ph , pm )(R−pZ Z)+g 0 [φ(ph , pm )(ωi −pZ Z)])
∂pm

so the public good is a gross substitute (resp. a gross complement) to the housing if
and only if it is also a gross substitute (resp. a gross complement) to the available
wealth.
Lemma 4. The favorite tax rate function is everywhere monotonic with respect to
private wealth if and only if the public good is a gross substitute or a gross complement
to the other good.
Proof. By deriving 1 with respect to the private wealth, one gets :
p
1
1
M
∂Z M ( F πζ 1(ζ,S) , ωpi , ω1i , 1)
∂t∗ (F, S, p, ωi )
−1
πζζ (ζ, S) ∂Z ( F πζ (ζ,S) , ωi , ωi , 1)
= 2
[
+(p+k)
]
∂ωi
ωi πζ (ζ, S) F πζ2 (ζ, S)
∂pZ
∂ph

with

∂Z M ( F πζ 1(ζ,S) , ωpi , ω1i , 1)
∂p

=k

∂Z M ( F πζ 1(ζ,S) , ωpi , ω1i , 1)
∂pm

with k > 0, then one has :
(1−

p
1
1
M
∂Z M ( F πζ 1(ζ,S) , ωpi , ω1i , 1)
−1
πζζ (ζ, S) ∂Z ( F πζ (ζ,S) , ωi , ωi , 1) ∂t∗ (F, S, p, ωi )
)
)
=
(1+k)
F πζ2 (ζ, S)
∂pZ
∂ωi
ωi2
∂ph

12
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Since the public good is assumed to be a normal good (and a fortiori, a non-Giffen
π (ζ,S)
) > 0, so
good), and since π(.) is concave, then (1 − F ζζ
π 2 (ζ,S)
ζ

sign(

∂t∗ (F, S, p, ωi )
1
p 1
) = −sign(Z M (
, , , 1)∂ph )
∂ωi
F πζ (ζ, S) ωi ωi

The GSC condition is restrictive enough to be discussed, but nevertheless it is not
outlandish. For instance, suppose that the only competence the central government
has transfered to the studied jurisdictions level is social aid. Then, one may assume
that the public good will be a substitute to the two other goods. On the contrary,
if the jurisdiction is competent only in cultural activies, then the public good will
probably be a complement. Suppose now that the jurisdiction is in charge of primary
schools. In this case, the relation between the public good and the other goods is
not trivial, and may vary with respect to the jurisdiction parameters and the private
wealth.
To prove the sufficiency of the GSC condition, the notion of indifference curve has
to be introduced.
4
, let define F u (u, t, p, S), ωi ):
Definition ∀(t, u, p, S, ωi ) ∈ [0; 1] × R+

U (π(tf (u, p, t, S, ωi ), S), hM (Z, p, (1 − t)ωi ), mM (Z, p, (1 − t)ωi )) ≡ u
as the indifference curve of a household with private wealth ωi , that is to say the
amount of fiscal potential the household needs to reach utility u in a jurisdiction with
housing price p, tax rate t and spillovers S.
The assumptions imposed on the utility function and on π(.) ensure the existence
and the derivability of F u .The slope of the indifference curve in the plane (t,F) is
given by
Ftu (u, t, p, S), ωi ) =

ωi
1
[
− F̄ ]
t πζ (tF, S)M RS u (π(tF̄ , S), (1 − t)ωi )

(7)

The next lemma, that will be used to prove the sufficiency of the GSC condition
to have every stable jurisdiction structure segregated, states that the GSC condition
implies the ordering of the indifference curves slopes with respect to wealth.
i)
k)
2
Lemma 5. ∂f (u,t,p,S,ω
, ωi < ωk if
≤ (resp. ≥) ∂f (u,t,p,S,ω
all(t, p, S) ∈ [0; 1] × R+
∂t
∂t
the public good is a substitute (resp. a complement) to the two other goods3 .

Proof. The proof is provided for the case of gross complementary, the case of gross
substitutability being symmetric. Assume that the public good is a gross comM
plement to the two other goods. Then, by definition, ∂Z (pZ∂p,phh ,pm ,ωi < 0 and
∂Z M (pZ ,ph ,pm ,ωi
∂pm

4
< 0. Let (t, F, S, p) ∈ [0; 1] × R+
be a certain combination of tax
2
rate, fiscal potential, spillovers and housing price and (a, b) ∈ R+
two amount of
private wealth (a < b). Let define (a) and ω(a) such that

ZM (

1
p
1
,
,
, 1) = π(tF, S)
πζ (tF, S)F (a) ω(a) ω(a)

3 Actually, the ordering of the indifference curve slopes with respect to the private wealth is
equivalent to the GSC condition, but the implication is sufficient to prove our theorem.
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and
phM (

1
p
1
1
p
1
,
,
, 1) + mM (
,
,
, 1) = (1 − t)a
πζ (tF, S)F (a) ω(a) ω(a)
πζ (tF, S)F (a) ω(a) ω(a)

Hence, the Marginal Rate of Substitution between the public good on one hand,
and the housing and the money available for other expenditure on the other hand,
which is a function M RS u (Z, h + m) is equal, at the optimum, to the price ratio, and,
by definition, the chosen bundle respects the budget constraint :
ω(a)
πζ (tF, S)F (a)
π(tF, S)
(1 − t)a
+
=1
πζ (tF, S)F (a)
ω(a)

M RS u (π(tF, S), (1 − t)a) =

(8)
(9)

Combining 8 and 9 yields :
M RS u (π(tF, S), (1 − t)a)
1−t
=
πζ (tF, S)F (a) + π(tF, S)
a
p
1
and ω(b)
are respectively the highest housing
Let now define ω(b) such that ω(b)
price and available money price that would allow a household with private wealth 1
to afford the bundle (not necessarly the optimal one) (π(tF, S), h, m), with ph+m
ω(b) =
1
(1 − t)b, if the public good price is still πζ (tF,S)F (a) . Given the budget constraint, one
has :

ω(b) =

πζ (tF, S)F (a)(1 − t)b
> ω(a)
πζ (tF, S)F (a) − π(tF, S)

(10)

Since the public good is a complement, then one must have :
ZM (

1
p
1
1
p
1
,
,
, 1) ≤ Z M (
,
,
, 1)
πζ (tF, S)F (a) ω(a) ω(a)
πζ (tF, S)F (a) ω(b) ω(b)

Moreover, the slope of the indifference curve must be, in absolute value, more than
ω(k)
the price ratio πζ (tF,S)F
(a) :
M RS u (π(tF, S), (1 − t)b) ≥

ω(k)
πζ (tF, S)F (a)

which is equivalent to
M RS u (π(tF, S), (1 − t)b)
(1 − t)
≥
b
πζ (tF, S)F (a) − π(tF, S)
Using 10, one obtains:
M RS u (π(tF, S), (1 − t)b)
M RS u (π(tF, S), (1 − t)a)
≥
b
a
⇔

b
a
≤
M RS u (π(tF, S), (1 − t)b)
M RS u (π(tF, S), (1 − t)a)
Using the definition of Ftu given by 7, the implication is etablished.
14
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This lemma is particularly important to prove the sufficiency of this article’s main
result, which is the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For any possible economy, every stable jurisdiction structure will be segregated if and only if the public good is either a gross complement or a gross substitute
to the two other goods.
Let begin the proof of this theorem by the sufficiency of the condition.
Proposition 1. If the GSC condition holds, then every stable jurisdiction structure
is segregated.
Proof. Suppose that there exist 2 jurisdictions j1 and j2 with respective parameters
(F1 , S1 , t1 , p1 ) and (F2 , S2 , t2 , p2 ) and 3 households with private wealth a, b, c, a < b <
c, such that :
f (π(t1 F1 ), S1 )) + g[φ(p1 )((1 − t1 )a) > f (π(t2 F2 , S2 )) + g[φ(p2 )((1 − t2 )a)
f (π(t1 F1 ), S1 )) + g[φ(p1 )((1 − t1 )b) < f (π(t2 F2 , S2 )) + g[φ(p2 )((1 − t2 )b)
f (π(t1 F1 ), S1 )) + g[φ(p1 )((1 − t1 )c) > f (π(t2 F2 , S2 )) + g[φ(p2 )((1 − t2 )c)
Suppose, with no loss of generality, that p1 > p2 .
Consider the hypothetical jurisdiction j0 with parameters (F0 , S2 , t0 , p2 ) with t0 =
φ(p1 )
and F0 = π −1 (π(F1 , S1 ); S2 ) Hence, every household is indifferent
1 − (1 − t1 ) φ(p
2)
between j1 and j0 , because in both jurisdictions, the amont of available public good
is the same and their purchasing power is the same. Then,
f (Z1 ) + g[φ(p0 )((1 − t0 )a) > f (Z2 ) + g[φ(p2 )((1 − t2 )a)
f (Z1 ) + g[φ(p0 )((1 − t0 )b) < f (Z2 ) + g[φ(p2 )((1 − t2 )b)
f (Z1 ) + g[φ(p0 )((1 − t0 )c) > f (Z2 ) + g[φ(p2 )((1 − t2 )c)
which, according to the lemma 4, is impossible if the GSC condition holds.
Now that the sufficiency of the GCS condition to have all stable jurisdiction structure segregated has been proved, the following proposition states that it is also necessary, by showing that any violation of the GCS condition allows to construct a
non-segegated but yet stable jurisdiction structure.
Proposition 2. Every stable jurisdiction structure will be segregated only if the GCS
condition holds.
Proof. Consider an utility function violating the GCS condition for some (F, S, p) ∈
3
R+
and some non-dengenerated interval W ⊂ R+ . Using lemma 3, the monotonicity
of the favorite tax rate function is known to be equivalent to the GSC condition, so we
know for sure that there exist (a, b, c) ∈ W 3 such that t∗ (F, S, p, a) = t∗ (F, S, p, c) >
t∗ (F, S, p, b) (the proof is the same if the favorite tax rate is increasing and then
decreasing with respect to the private wealth). Then one can always construct a
stable and non-segregated jurisdiction structure. Let create 2 subsets of jurisdictions,
both jurisdictions having a fiscal potential F , an amount of spillovers S and a housing
price p:
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• jurisdictions belonging to J1 are composed of certain measures µa and µc of
households endowed with private wealth a and c, and apply a tax rate t1 =
t∗ (F, S, p, a) = t∗ (F, S, p, c)
• jurisdictions belonging to J2 are composed of a certain measure µb of households
endowed with private wealth b, and apply a tax rate t2 = t∗ (F, S, p, B).
Such a jurisdiction structure is clearly non-segregated, because the 2 different types of
jurisdiction provide different amounts of available public good. Moreover, no household has incentive to leave its jurisdiction, since its favorite tax rate is applied, and
other parameters are the same in all the other jurisdictions. Let’s now prove that
there always exist positive measures µa , µb , µc , numbers M1 and M2 of jurisdictions
of respectively type 1 and type 2, a matrix of spillovers coefficients and available
amount of housing H1 and H2 such that, in each jurisdiction :
• Spillovers are equal to S,
• Fiscal potential is equal to F ,
• Housing price p is competitive.
We define respectively ζ1 = t1 F and ζ2 = t2 F as the amount of public good produced
by jurisdictions of type 1 and of type 2. For simplicity, jurisdictions in J1 will not
create any spillovers for jurisdictions belonging to J2 , and vice-versa. Since the func¯ ∈ R∗2 , ∃M :
tion S(.) is non-bounded from above, we know that ∀S̄ ∈ R+ , ∀(β̄, ζ)
+
(M − 1)β̄ ζ̄ < S̄ ≤ M β̄ ζ̄. In words, for any strictly positive amount of produced
public good and spillovers coefficient, by duplicating a jurisdiction a certain number
of times, any amount of spillovers can be bounded from below and from above. Since
S = 0 when the spillovers coefficient are null, one can deduc, using the Theorem of
Intermediate Value, that ∃β ∗ ∈ [0; β̄] : M β ∗ ζ̄ = S̄ As a consequence, we can always
find (M1 , β1 ) and (M2 , β2 ) such that
M1 β1 ζ1 ) = M2 β2 ζ2 ) = S̄
Now, let prove that we can always find a positive measures µa , µb , µc such that, in
each jurisdiction, the fiscal potential is F . Let consider a jurisdiction j belonging to
J2 . This jurisdiction is composed only of households endowed with a private wealth
b. Since all jurisdictions in J2 have the same measure of households and the same
spillovers coefficients, the congestion function can be re-written as a function of the
measure of households, the spillovers coefficient and the number of jurisdictions in
J2 . Let define C J2 (β2 , µb , M2 ) = C({µb }j∈J2 , {β2 }l∈J2 ). Hence, the fiscal potential of
this jurisdiction j is Fj = C(β2µ,µbbb,M2 ) .
Using the properties assumed on the congestion function, we can prove that
lim

µb →+∞

µb b
→ +∞
C(β2 , µb , M2 )

. Indeed, since
∀(j, k, k 0 ) ∈ J 3 , ∀{µl }l∈J−{k,k0 } ∈ RM −2 , ∀{βl j}l∈J ∈ [0; 1]M
:

∂ 2 Cj ({µl }l∈J , {βlj }k∈J )
≤0
µk →+∞
∂µk ∂µk0
lim

2
Then ∀(j, k, k 0 ) ∈ J 3 , ∀(µk , µk0 ) ∈ R++
, and ∀µ0k0 > µk 0 , one has

0<

∂Cj (µ1 , ..., µk , ..., µ0k0 , ..., µM2
∂Cj (µ1 , ..., µk , ..., µk0 , ..., µM2
≤
∂µk
∂µk
16
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As a consequence,
0<

lim

µ0k0 →+∞

∂Cj (µ1 , ..., µk , ..., µ0k0 , ..., µM2
∂Cj (µ1 , ..., µk , ..., µk0 , ..., µM2
≤
∂µk
∂µk

According to the congestion function’s properties,

lim

µk →+∞

∂Cj (µ1 ,...,µk ,...,µk0 ,...,µM2
∂µk

=

0. Then, using the Squeeze theorem (also called the Sandwich rule), one can deduce
that
∂Cj (µ1 , ..., µk , ..., µ0k0 , ..., µM2
lim
lim
=0
0
µk →+∞ µ 0 →+∞
∂µk
k
M
This proof can be reiterated to show that, ∀(j, k)i nJ, ∀{µl }l∈J ∈ R++
, ∀{βl j}l∈J ∈
M
R++ ,
∂C({µl }l∈J , {βl j}l∈J )
lim
lim ... lim
=0
µ1 →+∞ µ2 →+∞
µM →+∞
∂µk

So, ∀βb ∈ [0; 1] and ∀M2 ∈ N , one has
∂C J2 (µb , β2 , M2 )
=0
µb →+∞
∂µb
lim

Using L’hopital’s rule, one can show that:
lim

µb →+∞

µb b
J
2
C (µb , β2 , M2 )

=

lim

b

J
µb →+∞ ∂C 2 (µb ,β2 ,M2 )
∂µb

= +∞

Moreover, if the mass of households in a jurisdiction is null, then so is its fiscal
potential. Hence, by the Intermediated Value Theorem, we know that there exists µ∗b
µ∗ b
such that C(β2 ,µb∗ ,M2 ) = F . The same reasoning can be applied for jurisdictions in J1 ,
b
taking a constant mass of households with private wealth a over mass of households
with private wealth c ratio. We now choose the available amount of housing H1 and
H2 respectively in jurisdictions in J1 and J2 such that the price is competitive, i.e.
H1 = µa hM (p, (1 − t1 )a) + µc hM (p, (1 − t1 )c)
H2 = µb hM (p, (1 − t2 )b)
Then, for any violation of the monotonicity of the preferred tax rate function with
repsect to the private wealth, one can always construct a stable and yet non-segregated
jurisdiction structure.

5

Conclusion

The conclusion of this paper is that neither the congestion nor the existence of
spillovers accross jurisdictions modify the necessity or the sufficiency of the GCS
condition to ensure the segregation of every stable jurisdiction structure in a model
a la Westhoff.
This condition, which remains valid to the presence of an generalized utilitarian
redistributive central government, seems then quite robust to generalizations of the
model. Searching for a generalization that would make the condition either too weak
or too strong to have all stable jurisdiction structures would be a interesting objective
for further researches.
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